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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by Thomas D. Chambers ("Tom") and a crossappeal by Erin Jo Chambers ("Erin") from portions of an order
entered by the trial court following remand of this marital
dissolution action in a prior appeal, Case No. 900631-CA.

This

Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 79-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1990), which governs review of
domestic relations matters.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
•

After the trial court acknowledged that it had
erred by awarding alimony which exceeded
Erin's living expense by $108,000, did it err
again by refusing to order that Tom be reimbursed for the overpayment?

•

Did the trial
court err by reversing
its
original
order terminating spousal support
after six years, based on assumptions about
Erin's investment base and rate of return
which were outside the evidence in the record?

•

After finding on remand that Erin had the
financial means to pay her own attorney, did
the trial court err by ordering Tom to pay a
substantial portion of Erin's attorneys'
fees,
anyway?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

While a trial court has broad discretion to set alimony and
award attorneys' fees in marital dissolution actions, that discretion is not unlimited.
1979).

Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871# 872 (Utah

It must be exercised "within the bounds and under the

standards" set by the high courts of this state, and the decision

1

must be supported "with adequate findings and conclusions." Davis
v. Davis, 749 P.2d

647, 649

(Utah 1988).

In addition, the

appellate court can disturb an award where serious inequity is
manifest from the findings and conclusions. Paffel v. Paffel, 732
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
Failure to apply the correct legal factors in analyzing the
parties' circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. Naranio
v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988).

The factors

governing the determination of alimony are the financial condition
and needs of the receiving spouse; the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce a sufficient income; and the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support.

See Schindler v. Schindler,

776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989).

The factors governing the

decision to award attorneys' fees and the amount of such fees are
the reasonableness of the requested fees; the financial need of the
receiving spouse; and the ability of the other spouse to pay. Bell
v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Rasband v.
Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988)).
There

is another general standard which

procedural context of this case.

applies

in the

Where (as here) an action has

been remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate
court's opinion, the trial court must carefully heed the instructions contained in the mandate. Vinton Eppsco Inc. v. Showe Homes.
Inc.f 97 N.M. 225, 638 P.2d 1070, 1071 (N.M. 1981); In re Adoption
of BBC, 849 P.2d 769, 722 (Wyo. 1993); Bryfoale v. Arizona Deo't of

2

Corrections.
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deviation is reversible error.
In sum, a domestic relations order on remand will be reversed,
if there is a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law, if the
evidence clearly preponderates against a finding of fact, if there
is a serious inequity which must be rectified, or if there is a
departure from the appellate mandate. English v. English. 565 P.2d
409, 410 (Utah 1977)•

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order on Remand and related Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated March 2, 1994 which, among
other things, denied Defendant/Appellants Motion for Reconsideration/Rehearing of the Memorandum Decision dated July 12, 1993 and
Supplemental Memorandum dated November 19, 1993. R.O.A. 921-932.l
A copy of the Order on Remand is included in Appendix

1 to

Appellant's Brief.
On November 30, 1990, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County entered a Decree of
Divorce, together with related Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

*The following conventions are adopted for citations to the
record:
••R.O.A." refers to the pertinent page of the Record on Appeal filed
June 9, 1994.
"Tr." refers to the reporter's official transcripts of trial
proceedings in the case below, by volume and page.
"Exh." refers to the numbered trial exhibits in the case below.
"Decree" refers to the Decree of Divorce entered November 30, 1990
by Hon. Stanton M. Taylor (R.O.A. 398-412).
"Findings of Fact" refers to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law entered November 30, 1990 by Hon. Stanton M. Taylor (R.O.A.
378-397).
"Opinion" and "Op." refer to the Opinion filed by the Utah Court of
Appeals on October 21, 1992, by page number.
"Hr." refers to the reporter's official transcripts of the hearing
on remand on June 7, 1993, and hearing on Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration/Rehearing on February 28, 1994, by date and page.
"Order on Remand" refers to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order on Remand entered March 2, 1994 by Hon. Stanton M.
Taylor (R.O.A. 921-932).
4

Law. R.O.A. 378-397, 398-412. Both parties appealed. R.O.A. 415,
426.
On October 21, 1992, this Court reversed and remanded certain
rulings for further findings of fact, including the award of
alimony to Erin and the partial reimbursement of attorneys' fees by
Tom.

Op. at 2-5.2
On remand, the trial court acknowledged that it had made some

analytical errors. As pointed out by this Court, the trial court
admitted that it had failed to consider Erin's employability and
that it had improperly lumped the children's expenses into the
computation of Erin's living expense need.

See Op. at 3 & 4 n.l.

Because of this miscalculation, the trial court determined that
Erin had been awarded and had already received $108,000 more than
she was entitled to, but the trial court refused to order Erin to
return these overpayments to Tom.
But that was
financial

analysis

R.O.A. 731-737, 766-767.

just the beginning.
of

Erin's

available

Undertaking
investment

its own
base

and

anticipated rate of return, in complete disregard of the evidence
at trial, the trial court increased the duration of the alimony
payments from six (6) years to an indefinite period of time.
Despite making

an

express

finding

that

Erin

had

Id.

sufficient

financial means to pay her own attorneys, the trial court also
ordered that Tom reimburse her a total of $22,500.

Id.

^his Court also affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
Tom's future employment contract payments were not marital property
and reversed the trial court's division of Tom's retirement
benefits. Op. at 5-7. Those matters are no longer before this
Court.
5

Tom filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Rehearing of the trial
court's Memorandum Decision (dated July 12, 1993) and Supplemental
Memorandum (dated November 19, 1993).
859-883.

R.O.A. 731-737, 766-767,

The Motion was denied, and the trial court entered its

final Order on Remand on March 2, 1994. R.O.A. 921-932. Tom then
filed a notice of appeal, and Erin filed a notice of cross-appeal.
R.O.A. 955, 984.
The issues presented in this appeal are limited to those
portions of the Order on Remand:

(1) denying reimbursement of past

overpayments of alimony; (2) perpetuating the alimony award beyond
six years; and (3) awarding attorneys' fees on a finding of no
financial need.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on February 12, 1980 and divorced on
November 30, 1990. Tr. II: 2, 5; R.O.A. 398-412. During virtually
the entire ten-year marriage, Tom pursued a career as a professional basketball player. Tr. II: 24; Tr. IV: 86; Plaintiff's Exh.
2. The parties and their three minor children enjoyed a reasonably
comfortable lifestyle during the marriage, and they accumulated
substantial assets.

Tr. IV: 109-111; Defendant's Exh. 25.
Alimony

In order to maintain a standard of living reasonably similar
to that enjoyed during marriage, Erin testified at trial that she
would require a net income of approximately $10,000 per month for
herself and for the children who primarily reside with her.
II: 88-89, 91-92, 105-107; see also Plaintiff's Exh. 11.
6

Tr.

On the

fourth day of trial, the parties entered into a stipulation for
division of their real and personal property.
SM5-386.

Tr. IV: 2-3; R.O.A.

The trial court fixed Tom's child support obligation at

$4,500 per month ($1,500 per child), again by stipulation.
383-384,

403.

Although recognizing

R.O.A.

that Erin was receiving

substantial income-producing assets, the trial court awarded her
$10,000 per month alimony in addition to the child support, to be
reduced to $5,000 per month after three years, and to terminate
after six years.

R.O.A. 382-383, 402-403.

Both parties appealed the alimony award.

R.O.A. 415, 426.

This Court found that the trial court's findings of fact regarding
alimony were insufficient. Op. at 3-4. Contrary to the applicable
law, the trial court's findings did not address Erin's level of
education, health, and other matters concerning her immediate or
eventual employability.

1^.

In addition, the trial court had

"double-counted" the children's expenses, including them in both
the $4,500 monthly child support and in the $10,000 monthly alimony
award.

Id. at 4.

The Court reversed the alimony award and

remanded for further findings.

Id.

On remand, after considering Erin's employability and treating
her living expense need as a separate issue, the trial court found
that the alimony award for the first thr#e years should only have
been $7,000 per month, instead of $10,000 per month.

R.O.A. 732,

923-924. However, by the time it corrected its findings, the first
three years had already passed, and $108,000 in overpayments had
already been made.

Even though this Court had described the

situation as "plainly inequitable," Op. at 4 n.l, the trial court
7

amended its findings without curing the inequity.

It ordered that

Erin was not required to reimburse the substantial excess sum which
she had received.

R.O.A. 766-767, 924-925.

The trial court also ordered that the alimony would not
terminate

after six years, as originally

continue until Erin's death or remarriage.

ordered,

but would

R.O.A. 733-734, 926-

927. The trial court based its decision primarily on its independent determination

that Erin's available

investment

base was

somehow inferior to Tom's available investment base — ostensibly
because Erin's property settlement included notes receivable from
her own family which the judge deemed "probably uncollectible" and
because Tom's professional basketball career had lasted longer than
the judge expected.

R.O.A. 733-734, 736, 926-927, 929. The trial

court also hypothesized that the anticipated rate of return was
probably lower than was proven at trial, although no additional
economic evidence was introduced on remand.

Id.

Attorneys'Fees

Months before trial, the parties stipulated that Tom would
advance Erin $12,500.00 for attorneys' fees, subject to adjustment
at the time of the final decree and distribution.
394.

R.O.A. 98, 393-

Erin's trial counsel presented an affidavit reciting that

$58,000.00 had or would be incurred by Erin for legal services.
Tr. II: 160-162; Plaintiff's Exh. 17. The trial court found that
enough money was being distributed to permit each party to pay his
or her own attorneys' fees, but concluded that Tom should still pay
an additional $10,000.00 "in view of the sums of money that Mr.

8

Chambers is going to be making over the next few years."

R.O.A.

393-394, 411.
Both parties appealed the trial court's award of attorneys'
fees to Erin.

R.O.A. 415# 426.

This Court found that the award

was an abuse of discretion, because the trial court did not address
the reasonableness of the fees and stopped short of finding that
each party would have the means to pay their own fees.

Op. at 5.

The Court reversed the award and remanded the issue for consideration under the standards announced in Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489,
493 (Utah App. 1991).

Id.

On remandf the trial court reviewed the record and made a
determination that the attorneys' fees requested by Erin were "not
unreasonable" and that Tom had the ability to pay Erin's attorneys'
fees. R.O.A. 734, 927-928. But, in addition, the trial court made
the explicit finding that "filt is clear with the distribution of
almost a million and a half dollars in assets, that fErinl could
pay her own attorney." R.O.A. 735-736, 921, 930 (emphasis added).
Despite this explicit finding, the trial court reaffirmed its award
of attorneys' fees, again theorizing that it would be unfair to
"erode" Erin's investment base even to this extent, in light of the
supposedly
expenses.

uncollectible

notes

receivable,

taxes,

and

other

Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court previously held that it was "plainly inequitable"
that the children's expenses (which were the basis for a separate
child support award) were also included in Erin's living expense
9

need, Op. at 4 n.l, and it directed the trial court to reconsider
the amount of the alimony award accordingly.

On remand, the trial

court separately computed Erin's monthly expenses and determined
that spousal support should have been set at $7,000 per month,
instead of $10,000 per month.

Although the trial court acknowl-

edged that it had made a mistake, it nevertheless concluded that
Erin did not have to reimburse the substantial overpayments which
she had already received before the mistake was corrected.

The

trial court's latest ruling is even more "plainly inequitable" than
the last one!
The trial court's conclusion was based on its belief that
Erin's investment base had already been decreased by supposedly
uncollectible notes receivable from her family included in the
stipulated property distribution, and that her investment base
would be further undermined if she had to repay the overpayments of
alimony. The trial court erred because:

(1) the overpayments were

Tom's separate property which the trial court had no power to
distribute to Erin post-decree; (2) there was no evidence that the
notes receivables were uncollectible or that Erin's investment base
would be undermined if she reimbursed Tom for the overpayments; and
(3) the spirit of this Court's mandate was ignored.
On remand, the trial court also reversed its original order
that alimony payments would terminate after six years, and ordered
instead that the obligation would continue indefinitely until
Erin's death or remarriage.

Contrary to the evidence in the

record, the trial court postulated that Erin's investment base was
somehow less reliable than Tom's and that Erin could expect a four
10

percent

(4%) return, instead of the eight percent

acknowledged at trial.

(8%) return

The trial court erred because:

(1) it

failed to comply with this Court's mandate for "further explanation" of the original decision; and (2) it based its new decision
on evidence outside the record.
Finally, on remand, the trial court reaffirmed its original
decision to award Erin partial reimbursement of her attorneys'
fees.

The trial court predicated its decision on its belief that

taxes, the notes receivable, court

costs, witness

fees, and

attorneys' fees must have made "substantial inroads" into Erin's
investment base.

The trial court erred because:

(1) its assump-

tion about the erosion of Erin's investment base was not supported
by the evidence; and (2) an award of attorneys' fees is contrary to
law when there was an explicit finding that Erin "could pay her own
attorney" in light of her receipt of assets valued at $1.5 million.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court's Decision that Erin is Not Required to
Reimburse Tom for Overpayments of Alimony is Contrary to the
Law, the Facts and the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this Case.
At trial, Erin testified that she would require a net income

of approximately $10,000 per month for herself and the parties'
three minor children in order to maintain a standard of living
reasonably similar to that enjoyed during marriage. Tr. II: 88-89,
91-92, 105-107; Plaintiff's Exh. 11.

By stipulation between the

parties, Tom's child support obligation was fixed at $4,500 per
month ($1,500 per child).

R.O.A. 383-384, 403.

The trial court

awarded Erin alimony of $10,000 per month for the first three years
11

in addition to the child support, to be reduced to $5,000 per month
for the next three years, after which alimony would terminate.
R.O.A. 382-383, 402.
The trial court's finding with respect to alimony was as
follows:
The plaintiff [Mrs. Chambers] presented to the court
in her "Exhibit 11," a request and demonstrated need for
alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month with an
additional $4,000.00 per month being requested by
plaintiff as necessary to pay the income taxes on the
$10,000.00 per month. Plaintiff testified that many of
the base expenses were also expenses that would apply to
the children as well as herself. Defendant [Mr. Chambers] contends that plaintiff is not entitled to any
award of alimony based upon the substantial assets she is
receiving.
Considering defendant's "Exhibit 25," the
court finds that the plaintiff has a need to maintain a
standard of living somewhat close to what the parties
maintained in the past. The court further determines
that the defendant has the ability to pay and plaintiff
should be awarded alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per
month, which should continue for three (3) years.
Thereafter, plaintiff should be paid alimony in the sum
of $5,000.00 per month for an additional three (3) years
after which alimony will terminate. The reason that the
alimony should decline after three (3) years and terminate after six (6) years, is based upon the finding by
the court that the plaintiff will earn substantial income
from assets that have been awarded to her and which will,
by the time three (3) years have passed, be substantially
in her possession or under her control and she will be
able to invest these assets in such a way as to produce
income for her own support.
R.O.A. 382-383.

Both parties appealed the alimony award.

R.O.A.

415, 426.
This Court held that the trial court's finding was insufficient

under

the

three-prong

test

announced

in

Schindler

v.

Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). Op. at 3. In particular,
the trial court failed to address Erin's level of education, health

12

and other matters concerning her immediate or eventual employability.

!£.

In addition, this Court held that:

Additionally, upon remand the district court must
reconsider its apparent inclusion of the children's
expenses in Mrs. Chambers' alimony award.
In its
findings, the court acknowledges that many of the
expenses listed in Mrs. Chambers' request for $10,000 per
month alimony were expenses that applied to the children.
In view of the district court's award of $4,500 per month
in child support, it is plainly inequitable that Mr.
Chamber's alimony payment includes the children's
expenses.
Op. at 4 n.l (emphasis added).

This Court reversed and remanded

the trial court's award of alimony for further findings consistent
with the opinion.

Id.

On remand, the trial court found that although Plaintiff's
Exhibit 11 correctly reflected Erin and the children's needs at
about $10,000 per month, Exhibit 11 failed to include Erin's need
for health and accident insurance and money to offset the tax
liability on the alimony.

R.O.A. 732, 923-924.

In recalculating

the alimony, the trial court added insurance and taxes to the
expenses listed on Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, then deducted the child
support, and concluded that Erin "has need of about $7,000 [per
month] to maintain her prior standard of living." Id. This raised
the question of how to deal with the overpayments between November
1990 and October, 1993, totalling $108,000.
Although thm trial court conceded both the miscalculation and
the overpayments. It nevertheless held that Erin would not have to
return Tom's monsy:
To require the Plaintiff to repay those overpayments
would seriously affect her ability to maintain her
standard of living.
It would undermine further her
investment base to a very serious extent. In addition,
13

in dividing the estate, we had awarded to her an obligation of her family which at this point seems unlikely to
be collected. The decision to loan the money to the
plaintiff's brother [sic] appears to have been a joint
decision. The diminution of her estate by both the loan
and repayment of alimony based upon the court's mistake,
somehow seems unfair. The Court accordingly declines to
order repayment based upon the equities of property
division, earning ability, etc.
R.O.A. 766-767; see also R.O.A. 924-925.
There is no legal, factual, or equitable justification for the
trial

court's refusal to

overpayment of alimony.

order reimbursement

to Tom

of the

Simply stated, the overpayments (and any

interest thereon) are Tom's post-decree separate property.

Erin

has no legal claim to such property (as this Court made clear in
the section of its opinion concerning future earnings), and the
trial court has no power to distribute such property to Erin.
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980); see also
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982).

The trial

court exceeded its jurisdiction when it effectively declared that
Erin could keep Tom's money to remedy perceived imbalances in the
parties' potential investment income.
The trial court refused to order Erin to repay the overpayments because it believed that:

(1) debt payable by Erin's family,

awarded Erin in the property distribution, "seems unlikely to be
collected" and thereby reduces her investment base; (2) restoring
the overpayments to Tom would "undermine further her investment
base";

and

(3) to diminish "her estate by both the [family

receivables] and repayment of alimony based upon the court's
mistake, somehow seems unfair."

R.O.A. 766-767, 924-925.

14

These

beliefs do not confer legal authority on the trial court to
distribute Tom's post-decree earnings to Erin.
Moreover, the trial court's beliefs are absolutely without
factual support in the record.

The debt the trial court referred

to was actually two loans made to Erin's family — a $100,000 loan
to her father and a $6,000 loan to her sister and brother-in-law.
Tr. II: 28-30; Tr. Ill: 14-15.

The parties stipulated at trial

that those notes receivable would be awarded to Erin.
47-48.

Tr. IV: 2,

There is no evidence in the trial record that these debts
See Tr. I: 65, 67; Tr. II: 28-30, 81-82; Tr.

are uncollectible!

Ill: 14-15, 140-142; Tr. IV: 157-158. In fact, there was evidence
before the trial court that Erin's sister and brother-in-law had
already begun repaying their loan and that Erin's father intended
to repay his loan.

Tr. I: 67; Tr. II: 29-30; Tr. IV: 157-158.

The first time that anyone even suggested that the debts were
uncollectible appeared in Plaintiff's Remand Response Memorandum,
where Erin's current attorney (who did not represent her at trial)
off-handedly remarked that "[o]n the loan receivables, $106,000.00
is an obligation owed from Erin's family which has not been paid
and in all probably [sic] will not be.
family members."
was not

R.O.A. 685.

supported

by

any

She does not want to sue

This comment is not evidence.

citation

to the record

It

at trial.

Furthermore, even if he did not claim that the debts are uncollectible, but simply that Erin now chooses not to collect them.

The

redistribution of marital property based on Erin's change of heart
was not before the trial court.

15

The trial court also believed that repayment of the alimony
would "seriously affect [Erin's] ability to maintain her standard
of living" or "undermine . . . her investment base to a very
serious extent."

R.O.A. 766-767.

This is rank speculation.

Simple logic supports the opposite conclusion: Erin's standard of
living and investment base were quite obviously increased during
the period of time when she received sums in excess of her living
expense need.

She had $3,000 per month in excess disposable

income, which she either invested or otherwise used to achieve a
standard of living higher than she enjoyed during the parties'
marriage.
The trial court had already determined that, after the first
three years, Erin would be earning "substantial income" from the
investment of assets awarded her (i.e., her investment base) so as
to justify first a reduction in and eventually a termination of
alimony. R.O.A. 382-383. Erin's 1993 investment base should have
been $1,497,578.00, comprised of two installments of Tom's 19891990 season income, certain annuities, equalization payments from
Tom, checking accounts, loan receivables, tax exempt municipal
bonds, and three payments from the Seattle Supersonics.
discussion infra, pp. 19-21.

See

Because of the trial court's error,

she received another $108,000, which the trial court let her keep.
Ordering repayment would not have reduced Erin's investment base or
lowered her standard of living, because the overpayments should
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never have been made available to her to invest or spend in the
first place.3
The trial court's refusal to order a refund is, in the words
of this Court, Mplainly inequitable.M

Op. at 4 n.l. Over a three-

year period, Erin received $108,000 more than she was entitled to
receive.

Thanks to this Court, the trial court admitted that its

initial alimony analysis was flawed, but it still refuses to
correct the mistake.

In order to effectuate both the letter and

the spirit of its previous mandate, this Court must now specifically direct the trial court to order Erin to refund the overpayments of alimony with interest at the legal rate.
II.

The Trial Court Erred in Reversing its Original Decree that
Alimony Would Terminate After Six Years.
In the original Decree, the trial court stated that, after the

first

three

years,

alimony

would

be

reduced

and

ultimately

eliminated because Erin's own investment income would then be
sufficient to meet her living expense need.

R.O.A. 382.

In the

prior appeal, this Court held that the trial court's findings were
not specific enough:
[W]ithout further explanation, the court's blanket
reference to [Erin's] "substantial
income from assets
that have been awarded to her11 is inadequate to justify
the court's reduction of alimony.
Without more, we
cannot determine whether such reduction constituted an
abuse of discretion.
Op. at 3-4.
alimony

Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the award of

,f

for further findings." Id. at 4.

3

Tom did not insist that the $108,000 plus interest had to
be re-paid immediately in a lump sum. The trial court could have
considered the possibility of ordering reimbursement in installment
payments.
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On remand, taking into consideration Erin's ability to earn
income, the return on her investment base, and the child support,
the trial court determined that after the first three years alimony
should be reduced to $3,000 per month. R.O.A. 733, 926. However,
the trial court also ordered that the alimony would thereafter
continue indefinitely!

The trial court stated:

The Plaintiff received as her share of the property
division $1,479,578. Realistically it would not be fair
to consider that figure as her investment base. There
are obviously attorneys' fees and costs of the proceeding
as well as taxes to pay, etc. She has also requested
that we deduct from her investment base her purchase of
a home and the debt by her family. It would not be
appropriate to allow the Plaintiff to remove the home
from her investment base and also allow her to claim rent
expense of over $1,000 per month.
Figuring a 4% return on her investment base, the
imputed income of $736, and the child support, the
alimony award should be reduced at the end of three years
to $3,000 per month.
I had previously ordered termination of alimony at
the end of [six] years. That decision was based on the
fact that when the Defendant is through with basketball
his ability to produce income is frankly no better than
Plaintiff's.
His present earning ability is based
strictly upon his status as a professional athlete. In
retrospect that is not entirely correct, for it fails to
consider the income he will earn in the meantime. His
investment base, considering his interim income, should
exceed hers by several times, giving him by far a
superior ability to provide on-going assistance.
The alimony then should not terminate except upon
the occurrence of remarriage, death, etc.

I have referred above to the debt to her family,
which is probably not collectable.
There was some
dispute at trial about whose idea the loan was and to
whom it should be assigned. I awarded it to Plaintiff
because it was to her family and because I believed that
she had some influence in the decision process. There is
likewise no question that the Defendant also had some
responsibility for that decision. While it is not my
18

intent to revisit that issue, I think it appropriate to
point out that the reduction in her investment base was
contributed to by that obligation and that is an equitable factor considered by the court.
R.O.A. 733-734, 736 (emphasis added); see also R.O.A. 926-927, 929.
The trial

court

exceeded the mandate

of this Court by

declaring that alimony would continue beyond the six-year rehabilitation period, without any evidentiary basis for reversing itself.
In the previous appeal, this Court held that the trial court could
not support a reduction in alimony with a blanket statement that
Erin would be receiving substantial income from assets awarded to
her.

Op. at 3. It remanded so that the Court could supplement its

order with "further explanation" and detailed findings drawn from
the evidence in the record.

The record was replete with this kind

of evidence, but the trial court chose to ignore it.

Instead, it

went outside the record and indulged in guesswork about Erin's
past, present and future financial condition. This was an abuse of
discretion.
It is well settled that the duty of a lower court on remand is
to comply with the mandate of the higher court, obeying all
directions without deviation.

Vinton EPPSCO Inc. v. Showe Homes.

Inc. . 97 N.M.

1070, 1071

225, 638 P.2d

(N.M.

1981).

Stated

differently, the trial court's jurisdiction on remand is circumscribed by the appellate opinion. Id.; see also In re Adoption of
BBC. 849 P.2d 769, 772 (Wyo. 1993); Brvfoale v. Arizona Dept. of
Corrections, 153 Ariz. 598, 739 P.2d 819, 821 (App. 1987).
On remand in this case, the trial court should simply have
supplemented

the previous

findings with

19

specific

evidentiary

support for the reduction and elimination of alimony, as ordered by
this Court in 1992. The record shows that, by stipulation of the
parties, Erin was awarded the following cash or cash equivalent
assets:
Last two installments of Tom's
1989-1990 season income

$ 80,000.00

Certain Annuities

$420,000.00

Equalization Payments from Tom

$377,892.00

Checking Accounts and Loan Receivables

$107,802.00

Tax Exempt Municipal Bonds

$ 26,384.00

Seattle Supersonics February 1991 Payment

$150,000.00

Seattle Supersonics February 1992 Payment

$152,500.00

Seattle Supersonics February 1993 Payment

$165.000.00

TOTAL:

$1.497.578.00

Tr. IV 2-3, 35-49; R.O.A. 385-393, 405-410.
At

trial,

Dennis

Abold,

a Certified

Public

Accountant,

calculated what the after-tax cash flow would be from the investment of the assets awarded to Erin, based on a reasonable interest
rate of eight percent (8%) per annum and a net tax effect of
thirty-five percent (35%).

Tr. Ill:

93-96.4 Mr. Abold testified

that the net income to Erin from the assets would range from
$2,807.00 per month in 1990, all the way up to $4,724.00 per month
in 1993 and beyond.

Id.

He further testified that when the

monthly child support of $4,500.00 is added in, the total after-tax

4

Mr. Abold based his calculations on a proposed property
division which closely approximated the amount of cash and cash
equivalent assets actually awarded to Erin. See Tr. Ill: 89-96;
R.O.A. 405-410.
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income to Erin, including investment income, would range from
approximately

$7,307.00

per

month

in

$9,224.00 per month in 1993 and beyond.

1990
Id.

to

approximately
Erin submitted

absolutely no evidence to contradict Mr. Abold's testimony.
At the end of trial, the trial court concluded that the
alimony should decline after three years and terminate after six
years, based

upon

the court's finding

that

Erin

"will earn

substantial income from assets that have been awarded to her and
which will by the time three (3) years have passed, be substantially in her possession or under her control and she will be able
to invest these assets in such a way as to produce income for her
own

support."

R.O.A.

382.

Clearly, Mr. Abold's

testimony

supported the order that alimony be gradually reduced and then
eliminated. By saying so, the trial court would have complied with
this Court's mandate.

By not saying so, the trial court deviated

from the directions on remand.
Furthermore, the trial court's new findings on remand are not
based on the evidence at trial or any subsequent evidentiary
hearing.

At the hearing on remand, the trial court specifically

determined that an evidentiary hearing on the alimony and attorneys' fees issues was not necessary, stating: "the Court has heard
the evidence and the record is available to me." Hr. (6/7/93) 5455, 57-58.

Therefore, the trial court should have limited its

research to a consultation of the trial transcripts and exhibits.
The trial court did not do so. Instead, it seized upon unsubstantiated and unproven assumptions outside the record.
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Most notably, the trial court speculated that Erin's potential
income should be calculated by "[f]iguring a 4% return on [Erin's]
investment base."

R.O.A. 926-927.

support that assumption?

Where is the evidence to

Certainly not in the testimony and

documents introduced into evidence at trial. Apparently, the trial
court accepted at face value the arguments of Erin's attorney on
remand that a rate between three and one-half percent (3.5%) and
four and one-half percent (4.5%) was more realistic than the eight
percent (8%) which was uncontroverted at trial.5

R.O.A. 685-686.

Where the admissible evidence is not in conflict, it is reversible
error for the trial court to make contrary findings.

See English

v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977).
The portion of the Order on Remand extending the alimony
indefinitely

was

also based,

in part,

on the trial

court's

erroneous belief that Erin's investment base had been eroded by
attorneys' fees and costs, taxes, and the "uncollectible11 family
loans discussed above. As also discussed above, the trial court's
belief that the family

loans were "uncollectible" is neither

supported by logic nor by the evidence.
14-17.

See discussion supra pp.

With respect to taxes, the evidence presented at trial

already took into consideration the tax effect on Erin's investment
base. Tr. Ill: 93-96. The trial court also allowed Erin an offset
for the tax liability on the alimony payments when it re-calculated

5

In fact, Erin's own expert at trial, Merrill R. Norman, a CPA
and financial analyst, testified that he assumed an interest rate
3f eight percent (8%) on an investment of the annuities. Tr. I:
L00-101.
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Erin's alimony award on remand. R.O.A. 732, 923-924. The subject
of attorneys' fees and costs is dealt with infra at Section III.
Finally, the trial court based its decision that the alimony
should not terminate upon its finding that Tom had the "ability to
provide on-going assistance."

R.O.A. 926-927.

In its Order on

Remand, the trial court states that it previously ordered termination of the alimony based on the fact that, when Tom is through
with basketball, his ability to produce income will be no better
than Erin's. Ifi. The trial court further states that it forgot to
take into consideration Tom's interim income and larger investment
base, and concludes that Erin should receive on-going alimony
because Tom will be able to afford it.

id.

The trial court's

reasoning and recollection of the record in this regard are both
unsound.
In point of fact, in its original Findings of Fact, the trial
court stated that "[t]he reason that the alimony should decline
after three (3) years and terminate after six (6) years, is based
upon the finding by the court that [Erin] will earn substantial
income from assets that have been awarded to her."

R.O.A. 383.

Thus, the trial court previously ordered termination of the alimony
because the evidence showed Erin would not need alimony after six
years, not because of Tom's ability (or inability) to continue to
generate future earnings.

The courts have consistently reversed

alimony awards that appeared to be designed to equalize disparity
in the parties' respective post-decree income levels rather than
merely

providing

supplementary

income necessary

to meet the

recipient's living expense need. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170
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n.3 (Utah App. 1990); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1083 (Utah
1988) (J. Hove, concurring and dissenting)•
For these reasons, the trial court erred in failing to specify
the evidentiary basis for its determination that alimony would
terminate after six years and compounded that error by hypothesizing reasons for extending spousal support payments indefinitely.
III. The Trial Court/s Award of Attorneys' Fees to Erin Despite its
Finding of No Need Was Error.
Before trial, the parties stipulated that Tom would make an
advance payment to Erin of $12,500.00 for attorneys' fees, subject
to adjustment at the time of the final decree and distribution.
R.O.A.

98, 393-394.

At trial, Erin's counsel presented

an

affidavit reciting that $58,000.00 had or would be incurred by Erin
for legal services.

Tr. II: 160-162; Plaintiff's Exh. 17.

Even

though the trial court found that "there is probably adequate money
being distributed to both parties to pay their own attorneys'
fees,11 it decided that Tom should pay Erin an additional $10,000.00
for attorneys' fees, "in view of the sums of money that Mr.
Chambers is going to be making over the next few years.11

R.O.A.

393-394, 411. Both parties appealed the trial court's award of a
partial reimbursement of attorneys' fees to Erin. R.O.A. 415, 426.
This Court held that the award of attorneys' fees was an abuse
of discretion,

because the trial

court

did not

address the

reasonableness of the fees and stopped short of finding that each
party would have the means to pay their own counsel. Op. at 5. It
reversed the award and remanded the issue for express consideration
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of the three elements outlined in Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 493
(Utah App. 1991).

Id.

In considering the first two elements on remand, the trial
court found that the amount of the attorneys' fees requested by
Erin was "not unreasonable" and that Tom had the ability to assist
Erin in paying attorneys' fees.

R.O.A. 734, 927-928.

The trial

court further stated:
The final prong of the "Bell" (810 P2d 489) analysis
relates to the ability of the Plaintiff to pay her own
attorneys' fees. It is clear with the distribution of
almost a million and a half dollars in assets, that the
Plaintiff could pay her own attorney. However the court
was concerned about the necessity of her being able to
maintain an appropriate investment base. I was aware
that there would be substantial inroads into that base by
reason of taxes, the debt owed by her family (which is
likely uncollectible), court costs, witness' fees,
attorneys' fees, etc. In the interest of her being able
to maintain a base sufficient to provide an appropriate
income, I felt she needed some assistance with the fees.
I ruled the attorneys' fees previously paid have been
paid with marital assets not to be considered in the
final distribution, and awarded her an additional $10,000
to apply to her attorneys' fees. Based upon the above
considerations I find that the Plaintiff has need of
assistance with her attorneys' fees.
R.O.A. 735-736 (emphasis added); see also R.O.A. 928, 930.
The trial court thus concluded on remand that Erin needed
assistance with her attorneys' fees only because it believed taxes,
family loans and legal expenses had made "substantial inroads" into
her investment base.

As established in the preceding sections of

this brief, there is no evidence that the family loans were
uncollectible, there is no evidence to establish the legal expenses
actually paid by Erin (even making the assumption that this would
be a relevant factor) and there is uncontroverted evidence that
taxes were already taken into consideration by the expert who
25

calculated Erin's investment income.

Thus, the trial court erred

in its conclusion that Erin's investment base was eroded.
There is no finding by the trial court that the attorneys'
fees she incurred would prevent her from maintaining an appropriate
level of investment income. To the contrary, on remand, the trial
court stated: "Tilt is clear with the distribution of almost a
million and a half dollars in assets, that Plaintiff could pay her
own attorney.•• R.O.A. 735, 928 (emphasis added).

There can be no

award of attorneys' fees without a showing of financial need. Kerr
v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980); Kallas v. Kallas. 614
P.2d 641, 646 (Utah 1980). Therefore, the award of attorneys' fees
to Erin must be reversed, and the trial court should be specifically directed to order Erin to reimburse the previous payments with
interest.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Tom requests that the Order
on Remand be reversed in part, with the following instructions on
remand:

(1) that the trial court be directed to order Erin to

reimburse Tom for overpayments of alimony in the amount of $108,000
plus interest; (2) that the trial court be directed to reinstate
its original order terminating alimony payments after six years;
and (3) that the trial court be directed to reverse its award of
attorneys' fees to Erin and order Erin to reimburse Tom for
previous payments in the amount of $22,500 plus interest.

In all

other respects, the Order on Remand and the Decree should be
affirmed.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ERIN JO CHAMBERS,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER ON REMAND *t ^ %

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No- 890901927
Hon. Stanton M. Taylor

THOMAS D* CHAMBERS,
Defendant.
BACKGROUND

On October 21, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals filed
its decision on the earlier appeal of this case.

See

Chambers v. Chambers. 198 U.A.R. 49 (Utah App. 1992).
After remand, the matter was placed on the Court's
calendar for a scheduling conference for January 19, 1993.
The parties, through their respective counsel, appeared
before the Court on that day, at which time the defendant,
through his counsel, filed with the Court a Memorandum on
Remand

and

proposed

Supplemental

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro
FLORENCE
AND
HUTCHISON

Tung.

Defendant's Memorandum contended

evidence existed

that

in the record to support

sufficient

supplemental

Findings, Conclusions and Amended Decree of Divorce and that
PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION
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no further hearing should be necessary.
The Court gave plaintiff additional time to respond to

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS
Civil No. 890901927
Findings, Conclusions, Order
Page No. 2

defendant's Memorandum and provisionally scheduled the matter
for trial on June 24, 1993.
On February

17, 1993, the plaintiff, through

her

counsel, filed a Response to Memorandum and thereafter the
Court scheduled a hearing for argument which was held
June 7, 1993. The parties, through their respective counsel,
presented their positions. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the Court announced that it felt sufficient facts existed in
the record to permit the Court to supplement its findings in
conformance with the directions of the Court of Appeals,
canceled the trial date and took the matter under advisement.
On July 9, 1993, the Court issued

its Memorandum

Decision.
On July 13, 1993, the plaintiff, through her counsel,
asked the Court for some further clarification with respect
to its decision, which clarification was provided by letter
from the Court dated July 16, 1993.
On September 15, 1993, the parties' counsel met with
the Court requesting additional clarification regarding the
FLORENCE
AND
HUTCHISON

effective date of the reduction of alimony.
that

matter

under

further

advisement

The Court took

and

issued

its

enters

the

Supplemental Memorandum on November 19, 1993.
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With

this

background,

the

Court

now

following:
r

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS
Civil No. 890901927
Findings, Conclusions, Order
Page No. 3

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this

case to this Court outlining three areas for the Court's
reconsideration. Those three areas were alimony, division of
retirement and an award of attorney fees.
2.

In this case, there is no question that in

considering

the

preferences

established

in Woodward

v.

Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the facts would favor a
present division of the retirement because the present value
is determinable and there are sufficient assets in the estate
to allow such a division. The Court has personally felt that
there should be a strong preference favoring a division which
would assure a non-working spouse with a secure independent
retirement income, but the Court defers to the wisdom and law
established by Woodward.
3. In reconsidering the alimony award in the original
Decree, it occurs that there were miscalculations.
4.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 correctly reflected the

needs of the plaintiff and her children at about $10,000.00
FLORENCE
AND
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per month.

That amount failed to consider her additional

need of health and accident insurance (previously provided by
the defendant) and money to offset her tax liability for her
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receipt of alimony.
5.

The

Court

recognized

there

were

substantial

v hd x)

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS
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children's

expenses

involved

in

the

Exhibit

11

needs

assessment, but those expenses would be approximately offset
by the fact that the child support nearly equalled the amount
of children's expense alleged on Exhibit 11 and the $4,500.00
child support was included in the income calculations.
6.

In recalculating the alimony, if the Court accepts

the expenses of Exhibit 11 and adds the expenses of health
and accident insurance and taxes on the alimony paid and then
deducts the child support, that means the plaintiff has need
of about $7,000.00 to maintain her prior standard of living.
7.

The estimated

$7,000.00 for the plaintiff to

maintain her prior standard of living does not factor into
any consideration of the plaintiff's ability to provide for
herself or money received as returns on investments from
assets awarded to her as part of the property division.
8.

It was the intent of the Court that the plaintiff

should have the initial three years as a rehabilitative
period to:
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A.

Martial her assets;

B.

Learn to invest appropriately;

C.

Make decisions about her future;

D.

Prepare for future employment;

E.

Become settled, etc.

9.

In the Court's reconsideration of alimony in the
*' ** •*

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS
Civil No. 890901927
Findings, Conclusions, Order
Page No. 5

Memorandum Decision issued July 9, 1993, the Court failed to
specify the disposition of the over-payment of alimony from
the time of the original Decree to the Order of the Court of
Appeals.

Upon reflection, that failure may have been a

result of a subconscious desire to not address the issues in
hopes it would go away.

To require the plaintiff to repay

those over-payments would seriously affect her ability to
maintain her standard of living. It would undermine further
her investment base to a very serious extent.

In addition,

in dividing the estate, we had awarded to her an obligation
of her family which at this point seems unlikely to be
collected.
brother

The decision to loan the money to plaintiff's

appears

to

have

been

a

joint

decision.

The

diminution of her estate by both the loan and repayment of
alimony based on the Court's mistake, somehow seems unfair.
10.
trial.

Plaintiff was thirty years of age at the time of

She testified that she had two and one-half years of

college and that she held certain jobs previously, including
teaching dancing, working in window display and as a clerk at
FLORENCE
AND
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ZCMI and a clerk at Stop & Shop.

She also testified she

helped manage some apartments. Plaintiff also testified that
she had not made any attempts to obtain any employment
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outside

of the

house.

The evidence

also

showed

that

plaintiff participated in many types of physical activities

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS
Civil No. 890901927
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and there were no reasons, health or otherwise, why plaintiff
could not be fully employed and contribute to her own needs.
Plaintiff could have found appropriate employment which would
provide at least a minimum wage income of $736.00 to assist
in providing her own needs.
11.

The plaintiff received as her share of the

property division $1,479,578.00. Realistically, it would not
be fair to consider that figure as her investment base.
There

were

obviously

attorney

fees

and

costs

of

the

proceeding, as well as taxes to pay, etc. The plaintiff has
requested

that we deduct

from her investment

base her

purchase of a home and the debt to her from her family.
12. It would not be appropriate to allow the plaintiff
to remove the home from her investment base and also allow
her to claim rent expense of over $1,000.00 per month.
13.

The Court figures with a four percent return on

her investment base, the imputed income of $736.00 and the
child support, the alimony should be reduced at the end of
three years to $3,000.00 per month.
FLORENCE
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terminated at the end of six years. That decision was based
on
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The Court previously ordered the alimony to be

the

fact

that when

the defendant was

through with

basketball, his ability to produce income is frankly no
better than the plaintiffs and his present earning ability is
v-0
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based strictly upon his status as a professional athlete.
15.

In retrospect, that is not entirely correct or it

fails to consider the income he will earn in the meantime.
His investment base, considering his interim income, should
exceed the plaintiff's by several times, giving him by far a
superior ability to provide on-going assistance.
16. The final issue requiring consideration is that of
the attorney fee award.

The stipulation at trial, as the

Court understood it, was that if Mr. Dolowitz were called to
testify,

he

would

verify

the

material

contained

in

plaintiff's Exhibit 17 and express the opinion that the time
and costs involved were reasonable taking into account the
complexity and seriousness of the issues involved.
defendant

did

reasonable,

not

but

stipulate

only

that

the
Mr.

charges
Dolowitz

or

time

would

The
were

testify

accordingly.
17.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 contained a summary sheet

of the gross charges, a breakdown of the hourly rate of
persons from Mr. Dolowitz's office working on the plaintiff's
FLORENCE
AND
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case, a monthly summary of charges, times and persons and
finally a day-by-day account of date, attorney, service
description, hours and charge.
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number

In considering the complexity of issues, the

of hearings, the conferences, the resolution of
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issues, the animosity between the parties, the amounts of
money and property, the Court believes the attorney fee
charges were not unreasonable.
19.

An additional issue relating to attorney fees is

the fact that the defendant with a multi-million dollar
income clearly has the ability to assist the plaintiff with
her attorney fees and in comparison of the resources of the
two parties, he is in a much superior position.
20. The final prong of the test established in Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) relates to the ability of
the plaintiff to pay her own attorney fees. It is clear with
the distribution of almost a million and one-half dollars in
assets, the plaintiff could pay her own attorney.

However,

the Court was concerned about the necessity of her being able
to maintain an appropriate investment base.

The Court was

aware that there would be substantial inroad into that base
by reason of taxes, the debt owed by her family which is
likely uncollectible, court costs, witness fees, attorney
fees, etc*
FLORENCE
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21.

In the interest of the plaintiff being able to

maintain a base sufficient to provide an appropriate income,
she has need of some assistance with her attorney fees.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
1.

The defendant

is awarded

all of his NBA or

r •..
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basketball

related

retirements

subject

to

paying

the

plaintiff one-half of the value in existence at the time of
the original divorce trial.

The value of the NBA Players

Pension Plan presented at the time of trial was $64,758.92,
one-half of which would belong to the plaintiff ($32,379.46).
2.

In

addition,

in

the

past

there

have

enhancements to the plan having retroactive effect.

been
If

enhancements have occurred since the time of the trial of
this matter, plaintiff shall be entitled to her share of any
such enhancements based on the Woodward formula. This shall
apply to any retirements existing at the time of the trial of
this matter.
3.

A minimum wage income of $736.00 per month should

be imputed to the plaintiff.
4.

Based on the findings concerning the plaintiff/s

return on her investment base, her imputed income as stated
above and the child support previously stipulated to and
ordered, plaintiff's alimony should be reduced to $7,000.00
per month effective with the Court's Memorandum Decision
FLORENCE
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dated July 12, 1993, which shall continue for the balance of
the three-year rehabilitative period, after which the alimony
should be reduced to $3,000.00 per month.
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5.

The alimony awarded herein should only terminate

upon the occurrence of remarriage, death or operation of law.
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6.

Based on the findings above and the standards

established in Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991),
the $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at the time of trial
is hereby affirmed.
ORDER
The Court having issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant be and he is hereby
awarded all of his NBA or basketball related retirements
subject to paying the plaintiff one-half of the value in
existence at the time of the original divorce trial.

The

value of the NBA Players Pension Plan presented at the time
of trial was $64,758.92, one-half of which would belong to
the plaintiff ($32,379.46).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition, in the past
there have been enhancements to the plan having retroactive
effect.

If enhancements have occurred since the time of the

trial of this matter, plaintiff shall be entitled to her
share of any such enhancements based on the Woodward formula.
•LORENCE
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This shall apply to any retirements existing at the time of
the trial of this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a minimum wage income of
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$736.00 per month shall be imputed to the plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the findings
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concerning the plaintiff's return on her investment base, her
imputed

income

as

stated

above

and

the

child

support

previously stipulated to and ordered, plaintiff's alimony
shall be reduced to $7,000.00 per month effective with the
Court's Memorandum Decision dated July 12, 1993, which shall
continue for the balance of the three-year rehabilitative
period, after which the alimony shall be reduced to $3,000.00
per month.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the alimony awarded herein
shall only terminate upon the occurrence of remarriage, death
or operation of law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the findings above
and the standards established in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489
(Utah App. 1991), the $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at
the time of trial is hereby affirmed.
this
STATE <
COUNTYi

K/

day of March, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

STANTOti/M.
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NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
TO DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS COUNSEL:
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Pursuant

to

Rule

4-504

of

the

Code

of

Judicial

Administration, you are hereby notified that the undersigned
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will hold the original hereof for a period of five days from
the date this notice is mailed to you to allow you sufficient
time to file any written objections to the form of the
foregoing with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned.
If no objections to the form are filed within that time, the
original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature
and filing.

,

DATED this£2ifL_ day of January, 1994.
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Plaintiff
818-26th Street
84401
Ogden, UT
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Remand, postage prepaid, to the following at the
addresses listed on this ,<7^)—"day
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Pete K. Vlahos
Attorney for Defendant
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401

of January, 1994.

Mark J. Robens
Attorney for Defendant
2901 N. Central Avenue #200
Phoenix, A Z ^ £5012
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